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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal: 
1. Whether Utah law requires trusteefs sale or 
foreclosure of real property given under a deed of trust as 
security for an obligation, before a personal action may be 
maintained on such obligation. 
2. Whether Utah law or Colorado law applies with 
respect to a contract and promissory notes negotiated and 
executed in Utah between Utah residents, but secured by real 
property located in Colorado, where Utah law was specifically 
selected by the parties in the subject contract to govern all of 
their rights and obligations. 
3. Whether the unrefuted evidence at the trial of this 
action was insufficient as a matter of law to support Harold W. 
Taylor's counterclaim. 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 860581 
Priority No. 13-B 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES 
This action is controlled by Section 57-1-32, Utah Code 
Annotated, and Sections 78-37-1 and 78-37-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
which provisions are set forth in full in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The plaintiffs, Dee W. Christiansen and Martin Jay 
Christiansen (the "Christiansens") brought this action against 
Harold W. Taylor ("Taylor"), the appellant herein, and John A. 
Westman ("Westman"), for judgment on two promissory notes. 
Taylor counterclaimed against the Christiansens for 
misrepresentation and tortious interference with contract and 
interference with prospective economic relations, and cross-
claimed against Westman for misrepresentation. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court 
On January 6, 1984, Taylor moved to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint on the basis that the action concerned lands located in 
the State of Colorado and that therefore the Utah court lacked 
jurisdiction. (R. 56-57.) By Order entered March 26, 1984, the 
district court denied Taylor's motion on the basis that this 
action concerned promissory notes and an agreement located in 
Utah, the parties to which were Utah residents. (R. 87-88.) 
On June 13, 1986, Taylor moved for dismissal of this 
action without prejudice or, in the alternative, a stay of these 
proceedings pending completion of trust deed foreclosure in 
Colorado. (R. 257-258.) This motion was denied by Order entered 
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July 15, 1986. (R. 284-286; Addendum B.) 
Trial of this action took place on July 21, 1986, 
resulting in judgment for the Christiansens on the subject 
promissory notes, and dismissal of Taylor's counterclaim and 
cross-claim. (R. 288-290.) 
After hearing on Taylor's objections thereto, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on September 22, 
1986, and a Judgment was entered on October 14, 1986. (R. 330-
339; Addendum C.) Taylor's Notice of Appeal was filed on October 
21, 1986. (R. 340-341.) 
Statement of Facts 
The parties to this action were, prior to March 30, 
1981, partners in BWC Development Company ("BWC"), the principal 
business of which was the development and sale of real property 
located at Durango Estates Subdivision ("Durango Estates"), in La 
Plata County, Colorado. (R. 2-3.) 
The plaintiffs, Dee W. Christiansen ("Dee 
Christiansen"), and Martin Jay Christiansen ("Jay Christiansen"), 
and the defendants, Taylor and Westman, each owned a 25 per cent 
interest in BWC prior to March 30, 1981, Taylor having previously 
purchased the interest of Dewey Beuchler, the original partner of 
the Christiansens and Westman in BWC. (R. 9.) 
By Agreement dated March 30, 1981 (the "BWC Purchase 
Agreement"), Westman and Taylor agreed to purchase the 
Christiansens' interests in BWC. (R. 9-20; Addendum D.) 
In connection with the BWC Purchase Agreement, Taylor 
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and Westman executed two Promissory Notes, also dated March 30, 
1981, each for $75,000.00, one each in favor of Dee and Jay 
Christiansen. (R. 21, 22; Addendum E.) The March 30, 1981, 
Promissory Notes were the basis for the judgment in favor of the 
Christiansens in this action. 
The BWC Purchase Agreement and the March 30, 1981 
Promissory Notes were negotiated and executed in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (R. 76, 251.) 
The front page of the BWC Purchase Agreement lists Salt 
Lake City, Utah as the place of the Agreement. (R. 9; Addendum 
D.) 
Paragraph 12 of the BWC Purchase Agreement provides: 
All rights and obligations of the 
parties shall be governed, construed and 
enforced according to the laws and the 
decisions of the State of Utah. 
(R. 14; Addendum D.) 
This action was commenced on December 16, 1983, the 
claim in substance being for judgment on the March 30, 1981 
Promissory Notes. (R. 2-8.) 
In an attempt at settlement of this litigation, Westman 
and Taylor executed an Assignment dated February 22, 1984. (R. 
123-137; Addendum F.) Under the settlement Assignment, Westman 
and Taylor assigned to the Christiansens certain proceeds payable 
under an Option Agreement between Westman and Taylor and third 
parties, and promised to execute and deliver to the Christiansens 
a Deed of Trust, covering certain lots in Durango Estates, as 
security for the amounts owing to the Christiansens under the BWC 
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Purchase Agreement, the March 30, 1981 Promissory Notes, and the 
settlement Assignment. As required under the settlement 
Assignment, Taylor and Westman executed and delivered a Deed of 
Trust (dated February 14, 1984, but executed somewhat later), 
conveying certain lots in Durango Estates to the Christiansens as 
security for the amounts owing. (R. 136-137; Addendum F.) 
No trustee's sale or foreclosure has ever taken place 
with respect to the lots covered by the subject Deed of Trust, 
which is still in effect. 
At the trial of this action, Taylor offered testimony 
as to his understanding that under the February 22, 1984 
settlement Assignment he was to be liable only for payment of the 
March 30, 1981 Promissory Notes or the loss of lots conveyed by 
the February 14, 1984 Deed of Trust, but would not be liable for 
both. Such testimony was objected to by the plaintiffs, which 
objection was sustained. (Tr. 113-116, 127-128; R. 499-502, 513-
514, Addendum G.) 
Evidence at trial was unrefuted that in October, 1980, 
prior to execution of the BWC Purchase Agreement and $75,000.00 
Promissory Notes, Taylor had arranged to sell his interest in BWC 
to Stephen Geiger (not a party in this action) for $350,000.00 
and had already received a $50,000.00 down payment therefor. 
There was also undisputed testimony that Dee Christiansen had 
urged Geiger not to complete the purchase, and that Geiger had 
not in fact done so, but had obtained a refund from Taylor of his 
$50,000.00 down payment. Undisputed testimony also showed that 
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Dee Christiansen's purposes in urging Geiger not to complete the 
purchase from Taylor were (1) to keep Geiger's money free for 
investment in another venture then being promoted by Dee 
Christiansen, and (2) to force Taylor to buy out the 
Christiansens' interests in order to keep BWC afloat. (Relevant 
pages from the trial transcript are attached as Addendum G; the 
testimony is summarized in greater detail under Point III of the 
Argument herein.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law, which is the law chosen by the parties and 
also the law called for by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws, requires that mortgage foreclosure or trust deed sale 
occur before any suit may be instituted for a deficiency. The 
Christiansens were required to exhaust the security before 
seeking a personal judgment against Taylor. 
The trial court's finding that Taylor had failed to 
prove his counterclaim for sabotage of his contract of sale to 
Stephen Geiger was contrary to undisputed evidence with respect 
to each of the elements of Taylor's claim. Since the trial court 
must necessarily have held that the testimony at trial was 
insufficient as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence 
is reviewable on appeal, and should be resolved in Taylor's 
favor. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, CHOSEN BY THE PARTIES, 
TRUST DEED SALE OR FORECLOSURE MUST FIRST 
OCCUR BEFORE A PERSONAL ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT 
FOR ANY DEFICIENCY. 
The BWC Purchase Agreement, dated March 30, 1981, 
provides in part: 
12. Construction. 
All rights and obligations of the 
parties shall be governed, construed and 
enforced according to the laws and the 
decisions of the State of Utah. 
(R. 14; Addendum D.) 
Paragraph 1.2 of the same Agreement makes specific 
mention of the Promissory Notes, of the same date, which formed 
the basis for the judgment in this action. (R. 10, 16, 17; 
Addendum D.) Paragraph 12, quoted above, does not limit its 
scope to the Agreement of which it is a part, but extends to 
"[a]11 rights and obligations of the parties." 
Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws (1971) , gives strong preference to the law of the state 
chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and 
duties. The only exceptions are where the chosen state has "no 
substantial relationship" and there is "no other reasonable basis 
for the parties1 choice", or where there would be violation of 
"fundamental policy" of a state with "materially greater 
interest". The foregoing exceptions have no application in the 
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present action. 
Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust deed ... an 
action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the 
trust deed was given as security ..." 
[Emphasis added.] 
If the deed of trust is foreclosed as a mortgage, the following 
provisions, Utah Code Annotated, apply: 
78-37-1. 
There can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter ... [Emphasis 
added.] 
78-37-2. 
If it appears from the return of the officer 
making the sale that the proceeds are 
insufficient and a balance still remains due, 
judgment therefor must then be docketed by 
the clerk and execution may be issued for 
such balance as in other cases; but no 
general execution shall issue until after the 
sale of the mortgaged property and the 
application of the amount realized as 
aforesaid. [Emphasis added.] 
Based on the foregoing provisions, it has been 
repeatedly held in Utah that a mortgage securing a debt must be 
foreclosed before an action may be maintained on the underlying 
debt. In First National Bank of Coalville v. Boley, 61 P.2d 621 
(Utah 1936) , this Court said: 
[T]here is no personal liability by the 
mortgagor until after a foreclosure sale of 
the security, and then only for the 
deficiency remaining unpaid, and ... a 
mortgagee may not have a personal judgment 
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against a mortgagor until the security has 
been first exhausted. 
J[d. at 623. 
The rule, as stated in Boley, has been applied to deeds 
of trust, Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1983), and has been consistently followed. Bawden and 
Associates v. Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982); Bank of Ephraim v. 
Davis, 581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978); Seaboard Finance Co. v. Shire, 
218 P.2d 282 (Utah 1950); Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Rouse, 47 P.2d 617 (Utah 1935). In Bank of Ephraim, supra, this 
Court said: 
[M]ortgaged property constitute[s] a primary 
fund or thing, to which the mortgagee must 
first resort for the discharge of the debt, 
and until that fund has been exhausted the 
mortgagee has no personal right of action 
against the mortgagor, unless the latter 
consents thereto. The courts can impose 
personal liability on the mortgagor only 
after having ordered sale of the property; 
and if after sale, a deficiency appears. 
Id. at 1003, emphasis added. 
The Christiansens obtained judgment in the present 
action despite the fact that they are still in possession of the 
lots conveyed by the February 14, 1984 Deed of Trust given as 
security for payment of the March 30, 1981 Promissory Notes. 
Utah law, selected by the parties, is firmly established that 
foreclosure or trust deed sale must occur prior to any suit for 
deficiency. 
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POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PARTIES1 
CHOICE OF LAW IS NOT ITSELF BINDING, 
UTAH LAW SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE APPLIED. 
No sound reason exists why the parties' choice of Utah 
law to govern w[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties" 
(R.14; Addendum D) should not be followed in this action. 
Howeverf additional reasons exist, apart from the parties' 
choice, for applying Utah law to require foreclosure prior to 
personal judgment. 
With respect to both the BWC Purchase Agreement and the 
March 30, 1981 Promissory Notes, Utah is the state of 
negotiation, execution, and performance, and the residence and 
place of business of the parties at the time of contracting. (R. 
9, 76, 251.) 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) 
provides: 
Section 188. Law Governing in Absence of 
Effective Choice by the Parties 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with 
respect to an issue in contract are 
determined by the local law of the state 
which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties under the 
principles stated in Section 6 [stating 
choice-of-law principles]. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of 
law by the parties (see Section 187) , the 
contacts to be taken into account in applying 
the principles of Section 6 to determine the 
law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
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(b) the place of negotiation of the 
contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter 
of the contract, and 
(e) the domicilf residencef nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business 
of the parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according 
to their relative importance with respect to 
the particular issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract 
and the place of performance are in the same 
state, the local law of this state will 
usually be applied, except as otherwise 
provided in Sections 189-199 and 203 [not 
here applicable]. 
Thus, all contacts except (d) in the quoted provision 
are located primarily or exclusively in the State of Utah. 
Although lands located in Colorado comprise a major portion of 
the subject matter of the contract, this action concerns the 
rights and liabilities of Utah residents under contracts and 
notes negotiated and executed in Utah. Utah is clearly the state 
primarily interested in this action, in addition to being the 
state whose law was selected by the parties. Therefore, Utah law 
should be applied. 
POINT III 
THE ELEMENTS OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACT WERE ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL BY UNREFUTED 
TESTIMONY. 
Inter alia, this action concerned a counterclaim by 
Taylor against the Christiansens for sabotage of an anticipated 
sale of Taylor's interest in BWC to Stephen Geiger. Over 
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Taylor's objection (R. 314-322), the trial court entered the 
following finding of fact: 
10. Defendant and counterclaimant, Harold W. 
Taylor, failed to establish that plaintiffs 
intentionally interfered with Harold Taylor's 
existing or potential economic relations with 
Stephen Geiger, that plaintiffs' conduct and 
actions with respect to Harold Taylor's 
existing or potential economic relations with 
Stephen Geiger were for an improper purpose 
or by an improper means, or that plaintiffs' 
conduct and actions actually interfered with 
Harold Taylor's existing or potential 
economic relations with Stephen Geiger. (R. 
333; Addendum C.) 
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293 (Utah 1982) , this Court quoted the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Section 766 (1979) , defining the tort of intentional 
interference with performance of contract as: 
conduct which "intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract 
between another and a third person by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third 
person not to perform the contract". 
Id. at 301. 
The elements of interference and damages were 
established by testimony which was uncontradicted. Taylor 
testified at trial that, in October, 1980 (prior to executing the 
BWC Purchase Agreement and Promissory Notes which led to this 
action), he had attempted to sell his BWC partnership interest to 
Stephen Geiger, that a price of $350,000.00 had been agreed upon, 
and that Geiger had given Taylor a check for $50,000.00 as part 
of the purchase price. (Tr. 81-85; R. 467-471; Addendum G.) 
Taylor also testified that Geiger withdrew from the purchase and 
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obtained a refund of the $50,000.00 down payment. (Tr. 101-102; 
R. 487-488; Addendum G.) The foregoing testimony was unrefuted, 
and was partially corroborated by Westman. (Tr. 137-139; R. 523-
525; Addendum G.) 
The evidence that Dee Christiansen's interference was 
intentional was also unrefuted. Taylor testified as follows 
concerning a meeting in October, 1980, between Taylor, Westman, 
Geiger and Dee Christiansen, where the agreement between Taylor 
and Geiger was discussed: 
Q. Did the deal — was the deal cancelled at 
this meeting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you think the deal had been completed 
prior to this meeting? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And how was the deal cancelled? 
A. During the course of the conversation Dee 
Christiansen looked at Geiger and said, this 
is not a good deal. I [you] don't want to do 
it. 
(Tr. 84; R. 470; Addendum G.) The foregoing testimony was not 
contradicted. Dee Christiansen, who Taylor testified had told 
Geiger that the purchase was "not a good deal", twice avoided 
answering direct questions on this point: 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Geiger not to go 
through with that transaction? 
A. We sat at a breakfast or luncheon meeting 
at the Holiday Inn, John and I and Hal and 
Jay, and we discussed certain options. And 
at that point I think they reached an impasse 
between the two of 'em. 
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Q. Was Mr. Geiger present? 
A. I believe he wasf yes. 
Q. You never told him not to do the deal? 
A. I think the problem was that, as I 
recall, was mostly between the methodology of 
the way the deal was to be done because Mr. 
Geiger wanted to syndicate the deal. And Mr. 
Taylor didn't really care except Mr. Westman 
didn't really want to syndicate it because he 
wanted to do it on borrowings rather than 
equity infusion by a syndication. And I 
think that's where the deal really broke 
down. 
(Tr. 58-59; R. 444-445; Addendum G; emphasis added.) 
In Isom, supra, with respect to the closely related 
tort of intentional interference with economic relations, this 
Court said the following about the element of impropriety: 
Two cases illustrate how breach of contract 
(or lease), when done with a purpose to 
injure, satisfy this element of the tort. In 
both cases, the defendant committed a breach 
not just to obtain relief from its obligation 
under the contract or lease (for which 
contract damages would have made the 
plaintiff whole), but to achieve a larger 
advantage by injuring the plaintiff in a 
manner not compensable merely by contract 
damages. 
Id. at 309, emphasis added. The Court cited Buxbom v. Smith, 23 
Cal.2d 535, 145 P.2d 305 (1944), in which the defendant's purpose 
was to facilitate its hiring of the plaintiff's employees, and 
Cherberg v. Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 Wash.2d 595, 
564 P.2d 1137 (1977), in which the defendant's purpose was to 
destroy the business of a lessee so that the defendant could 
retake the building, demolish it, and erect a more profitable 
building. In Isom, the lessor's purpose was to ruin its lessee's 
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business in order to reobtain possession of the lessor's building 
and sell it more profitably elsewhere. 
In the present action, it is undisputed that Dee 
Christiansen's purpose in inducing Geiger's breach was to keep 
Geiger's money free for investment in another venture being 
promoted by Dee Christiansen, and to force Taylor to buy out the 
Christiansens' interests in BWC. (Tr. 84-85, 101-102; R. 470-471, 
487-488; Addendum G.) Taylor's injuries consisted not only of 
the loss of the benefit of his bargain with Geiger, but also of 
the loss of the purchase price which he was forced to pay to the 
Christiansens in an effort to keep BWC afloat. Thus the 
requirement that the defendant "achieve a larger advantage by 
injuring the plaintiff in a manner not compensable merely by 
contract damages", Isom, supra, at 309, is satisfied. 
In Cherberg, supra, the Court said: 
The distinguishing feature between the two 
lines of cases [those which do and those 
which do not allow recovery] would seem to be 
whether the interference with business 
relations was a mere incidental consequence 
of the breach or a motive or purpose 
therefor. 
Id. at 1143. Stated another way, it is submitted that the 
distinction is whether the injury to the plaintiff is a necessary 
prerequisite to the defendant's obtaining the benefit which the 
defendant seeks, or whether the injury to the plaintiff is merely 
an incidental by-product of the defendant's actions. 
In the present action, interference with Taylor's sale 
to Geiger was clearly a necessary prerequisite to the freeing of 
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Geiger's money for investment in Dee Christiansen's other 
ventures, and was a necessary prerequisite to forcing Taylor to 
buy out the Christiansens' interest in BWC. 
No evidence was given at trial to refute Taylor's 
testimony as to what was said by Dee Christiansen at the October, 
1980, meeting to encourage Geiger to breach his purchase contract 
with Taylor. Dee Christiansen's reasons for doing so were 
similarly undisputed, and his actions were improper under the 
tests in Isom, Cherberg, and Buxbom, supra. Thus, judgment 
should have been in Taylor's favor on his counterclaim. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF INSUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT TAYLOR'S COUNTERCLAIM IS A 
CONCLUSION OF LAW SUBJECT TO APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Since the trial court's "finding" with respect to 
Taylor's counterclaim was made in the face of unrefuted evidence, 
the court must necessarily have held that the evidence was 
insufficient to uphold Taylor's claim as a matter of law. This 
Court has consistently held that the question of whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fact is a question 
of law for the court to determine and thus subject to appellate 
review. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982); Peterson v. 
Peterson, 642 P.2d 740 (Utah 1982); Foote v. Taylor, 635 P.2d 46 
(Utah 1981); Polyglycoat Corporation v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1979); Coronado Mining Corporation v. Marathon Oil Company, 
577 P.2d 957 (Utah 1978). It is also settled that the incorrect 
designation of conclusions of law as "findings of fact" does not 
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remove them from appellate review. Olwell v. Clark/ supra; 
Coronado Mining Corporation v. Marathon Oil Company, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant/ Harold W. Taylor, respectfully seeks an 
Order of this Court reversing the judgment of the District Court 
in favor of the plaintiffs and an Order dismissing the 
plaintiffs' claim until completion of trust deed sale or 
foreclosure. 
In addition^ Taylor seeks reversal of the District 
Court's dismissal of his counterclaim. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lS~VL^&&i of April/ 1987. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
KENT H0LL1 
GORDON J. STONSON 
Attorneys /or Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this /JrZ^t^day of April, 
1987, I hand-delivered four (4) correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to each of the following: 
BRYCE D. PANZER 
R. SCOTT HOWELL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
2046 East 4800 South 
Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
^-<*U-^ 
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ADDENDUM A 
PROVISIONS FROM UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED) 
Sec, 57-1-32, Sale of trust property by trustee - Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was 
given as security - Collection of costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under 
a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced 
to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the 
trust deed was given as security, and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness 
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date 
of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which 
the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses 
of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the 
fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In 
any action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
Sec, 78-37-1, Form of action - Judgment - Special execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real 
estate which action must be in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, 
with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, 
or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing costs, 
and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according 
to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a 
special execution or order of sale shall be issued for that 
purpose. 
Sec. 78-37-2. Deficiency judgment - Execution. 
If it appears from the return of the officer making the sale that 
the proceeds are insufficient and a balance still remains due, 
judgment therefor must then be docketed by the clerk and 
execution may be issued for such balance as in other cases; but 
no general execution shall issue until after the sale of the 
mortgaged property and the application of the amount realized as 
aforesaid. 
ADDENDUM B 
BRYCE D. PANZER 
R. SCOTT HOWELL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 414 5 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE W. CHRISTIANSEN and 
MARTIN JAY CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiffs, ORDER 
vs. Civil No: C83-8632 
JOHN A. WESTMAN and 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Harold W. Taylor moved this Court for an Order 
dismissing the above action or alternatively, staying the proceed-
ings pending foreclosure of certain real property located in La 
Plata County, Colorado. Defendant John A. Westman joined in 
the motion of defendant Taylor. This matter came on regularly 
for hearing on June 27, 1986, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
before the Honorable Judith M. Billings. R. Scott Howell and 
Bryce D. Panzer of Snow, Christensen & Martineau appeared for 
plaintiffs. Gordon J. Swenson appeared for defendant Taylor. 
Richard S. Nemelka appeared for defendant Westman. The Court 
_=D IN CLICK'S OFFICE 
Salt L-V-c County Utah 
JUL 15 1996 
H C . O r / , ()-Jt ZDZX C 0 U f t 
having reviewed the files, pleadings and memoranda, and having 
heard oral argument, and being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants' Motion for 
Dismissal Without Prejudice and Alternative Motion for Stay of 
Proceedings Pending Completion of Foreclosure shall be, and the 
same are hereby denied. 
DATED this J ^ day of v^Erey 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
SNOW, CHES-STE MARTINEAU 
J t t a i t l i m . B i l l i n g s Q 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
ATTEST 
ay 
rR. Scott Howell 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
HOLLAND & ANDERSON 
(Lh 
C* -35- ,*C> L '&f* 
By_ 
Gordon J. Swenson 
Attorney for Harold W. Taylor 
By w 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for John A. Westman 
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having reviewed the files, pleadings and memoranda, and having 
heard oral argument, and being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants1 Motion for 
Dismissal Without Prejudice and Alternative Motion for Stay of 
Proceedings Pending Completion of Foreclosure shall be, and the 
same are hereby denied. 
DATED this day of June, 198 6. 
BY THE COURT: 
Cd/Jt£„m •/?/& 
Judith M. Billings 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSSN/& RTINEAU 
Sccftt' Howell 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
HOLLAND & ANDERSON. 
By_ 
*± O^^^-^ Gordon J."TSwenson 
At torney /for Harold W. Taylor 
A-r T ^- o * 
Qo^btV 
By_ 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for John A. Westman 
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- t O IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
rr?j ^ P D I S e i t Lako County Utah 
SEP 22 1996 
BRYCE D. PANZER (A2509) H c,xCr ...,-^ r c . „ „ n 
R. SCOTT HOWELL (A4 0 5 6 ) ey —-JZ^mdJ^J "^ C°m 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU ~^3 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE W. CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN 
JAY CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiffs, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs . 
JOHN A. WESTMAN and HAROLD W. 
TAYLOR, Civil No. C83-8632 
Defendants. Judge Judith M. Billings 
The above matter came on regularly for trial without a jury 
on July 21, 1986, before the above entitled court, the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Court Judge, presiding. 
Plaintiffs, Dee W. Christiansen and Martin Jay Christiansen, 
were represented by Bryce D. Panzer and R. Scott Howell of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Defendant Harold W. Taylor was 
represented by J. Kent Holland and Gordon J. Swenson of 
C00330 
Anderson & Holland. Defendant John A. Westman was represented 
by Richard S. Nemelka. Witnesses on behalf of the parties were 
sworn and examined and documents and exhibits were admitted on 
behalf of the parties. Pursuant to stipulation in open court, 
plaintiffs submitted their evidence regarding attorney's fees 
and costs by affidavit, subsequent to the issuance of the 
court's decision on other issues. 
During the course of the trial, defendants moved the court 
for leave to amend the pleadings to state an affirmative 
defense of accord and satisfaction, based upon an Assignment, 
dated February 22, 1984, and received in evidence as defen-
dants1 Exhibit 10-D. Defendants* motion to amend was granted 
by the court. 
Plaintiffs moved the court to dismiss the counterclaims and 
third defense of defendant Harold W. Taylor at the close of 
defendant Taylor's case in chief. Plaintiffs8 motion to 
dismiss was granted by the court. Defendant John A. Westman 
moved the court to dismiss the cross-claim of Harold W. Taylor 
at the close of defendant Taylor's case in chief. Defendant 
Westman's motion to dismiss was granted by the court. 
Having issued its ruling from the bench, the court now 
makes and enters the following findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-2-
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 30, 1981, plaintiffs and defendants executed 
an Agreement (Exhibit 1-P), pursuant to which plaintiffs agreed 
to sell and defendants agreed to purchase plaintiffs1 partner-
ship interests in BWC Development Company, a partnership. 
2. On March 30, 1981, defendants executed and delivered 
to plaintiff Dee W. Christiansen a promissory note (Exhibit 
2-P) in the principal sum of $75,000. 
3. On March 30, 1981, defendants executed and delivered 
to plaintiff Martin Jay Christiansen a promissory note (Exhibit 
4-P) in the principal sum of $75,000. 
4. The promissory notes provide for the payment of all 
costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, incurred by the holders of the notes. 
5. The promissory notes each provide for interest at the 
rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum from and after March 30, 
1981, on the unpaid balance of the notes. 
6. The principal and accrued interest owed to plaintiff 
Dee W. Christiansen on the promissory note (Exhibit 2-P) is 
$95,071.58 as of July 21, 1986. 
7. The principal and accrued interest owed to plaintiff 
Martin Jay Christiansen on the promissory note (Exhibit 4-P) is 
$95,071.58 as of July 21, 1986. 
-3-
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8. Defendants failed to establish that they had been 
induced to execute and deliver the Agreement (Exhibit 1-P) or 
promissory notes (Exhibits 2-P and 4-P) by misrepresentations 
of presently existing material facts by plaintiffs. 
9. Defendant and cross-claimant, Harold W. Taylor, failed 
to establish that he had been induced to execute the Agreement 
or promissory notes by misrepresentations of presently existing 
material facts by cross-claim defendant, John A. Westman. 
10. Defendant and counterclaimant, Harold W. Taylor, 
failed to establish that plaintiffs intentionally interfered 
with Harold Taylor's existing or potential economic relations 
with Stephen Geiger, that plaintiffs' conduct and actions with 
respect to Harold Taylor's existing or potential economic 
I relations with Stephen Geiger were for an improper purpose or 
by an improper means,\or that plaintiffs' conduct and actions 
actually interfered with Harold Taylor's existing or potential 
economic relations with Stephen Geiger. 
11. Plaintiffs have incurred reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs in this action of $23,200. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following conclusions of law: 
-4-
(.00333 
1. The Assignment (Exhibit 10-D) and Deed of Trust 
(Exhibit 11-D), upon which defendants base their affirmative 
defense of an accord and satisfaction, are clear and 
unambiguous. 
2. The Assignment and Deed of Trust merely provide secu-
rity for the sums owing by defendants under the Agreement and 
promissory notes, and do not satisfy or waive plaintiffs1 
claims under the Agreement and promissory notes; therefore, the 
Assignment and Deed of Trust do not operate as or constitute an 
accord and satisfaction. 
3. The Agreement and promissory notes are valid and 
enforceable as against defendants John A. Westman and Harold W. 
Taylor. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the counter-
claims of defendant Harold W. Taylor, no cause of action. 
5. Cross-claim defendant, John A. Westman, is entitled to 
judgment on the cross-claim of Harold W. Taylor, no cause of 
action. 
6. Plaintiff Dee W. Christiansen is entitled to judgment 
against defendants John A. Westman and Harold W. Taylor, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $95,071.58, principal 
and interest as of July 21, 1986, and reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs of $11,600, for a total judgment of $106,671.58, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per annum 
from and after July 21, 1986, until paid. 
-5-
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7. Plaintiff Martin Jo Christiansen is entitled to judg-
ment against defendants John A. Westman and Harold W. Taylor, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $95,071<,58, principal 
and interest as of July 21, 1986, and reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs of $11,600, for a total judgment of $106,671.58, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per annum 
from and after July 21, 1986, until paid. 
DATED this ^ M a y of ^^tl^JuA / 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
JudYtli Mo Billings 
District Court Judge 
Approved As To Form:
 1§ J; 'J ? ^ J cv 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
ryce D//Panzer /) 
ttorn^ys for Plaintrff 
B 
A  
o#»* 
a. Ai^^ 
Ocvt.'tV ClsrJc 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
J. Kent Holland 
Attorneys for Harold W. 
Taylor 
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Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for John A. 
Westman 
SCMBDP1 
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BRYCE D. PANZER (A2509) 
R. SCOTT HOWELL (A4056) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
. . w O . - , - : v . 
OCT 1 4 
H Dixor. 
~L»^ <—r, 
- :t Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE W. CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN 
JAY CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN A. WESTMAN and HAROLD W. 
TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-8632 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
This action came on regularly for trial on July 21, 1986, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Judith M. 
Billings, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Bryce D. Panzer and R. Scott Howell of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau. Defendant Harold W. Taylor was 
represented by J. Kent Holland and Gordon J. Swensen of 
Anderson & Holland. Defendant John A. Westman was represented 
^J ooss'?-
by Richard S. Nemelka. The Court having entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and good cause appearing 
therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs be, and 
hereby are, granted judgment on the counterclaims of Harold W. 
Taylor, no cause of action. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant John A. 
Westman be, and hereby is, granted judgment on the cross-claim 
of Harold W. Taylor, no cause of action. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff Dee W. 
Christiansen be, and hereby is, granted judgment against 
defendants John A. Westman and Harold W. Taylor, jointly and 
severally, for the sum of $95,071.58, and attorney's fees and 
costs of $9,240.91, for a total judgment of $104,312.49, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per annum 
from and after July 21, 1986, until paid. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff Martin J. 
Christiansen be, and hereby is, granted judgment against 
defendants John A. Westman and Harold W. Taylor, jointly and 
severally, for the sum of $95,071.58, and attorney's fees and 
costs of $9,240.91, for a total judgment of $104,312.49, 
O00338 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per annum 
from and after July 21, 1986, until paid. 
DATED this U day of N<X&(M/^ 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
_ _ ^ £ ^ _ .... 
J&tfith M. Bi l l ings 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DiXOH hiN'-S-eY 
^ ^
= ?
 Deputy Cisrit Approved As To Form: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^ 
Bryce Dy/Panzer 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Gordon 
Attorneys 
Taylor 
/ensen 
:or Harold W, 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for John A, 
Westman 
SCMBDP2 
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ADDENDUM D 
AGREEMENT 
DATE: March , 1981 
PLACE: , Utah 
PARTIES: Dee W. Christiansen (hereinafter referred to 
as "Dee"j, Martin Jay Christiansen (hereinafter 
referred to as "Jay") , John A. Westman (herein-
after referred to as "John"), and Harold W. 
Taylor (hereinafter referred to as "Hal") 
RECITALS: 
A. Dee, Jay, JohnNand Hal are each the owner of a 
25 percent interest in BWC Development Company, a partnership 
organized pursuant to a Partnership Agreement dated September 
6, 1978, and currently governed by Amended and Restated 
Articles of Partnership, dated as of January 1, 1980, which 
partnership's initial business is the development and sale 
of real property located in LaPlata County, Colorado (herein-
after referred to as "BWC"). 
B. Dee and Jay desire to withdraw from BWC and to 
sell their interests therein and John and Hal are willing 
to purchase their interests in BWC, all on the terms and 
conditions contained herein. 
AGREEMENTS: 
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained 
herein, Dee, Jay, John and Hal agree as follows: 
1.. Sale. 
1.1 Dee and Jay hereby agree to sell and assign 
to John and Hal, and John and Hal hereby agree to purchase 
from Dee and Jay their 25 percent undivided interest in 
BWC, including all of its assets, liabilities and rights to 
future profits. The purchase price therefor shall be 
$300,000, plus interest and other considerations as set 
forth in 1.3 below, and John and Hal agree to pay said sum 
in the following manner: 
(a) $10,000 to serve as earnest money deposit, 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged; 
EXHIBIT "A" rnOOO9 
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(b) $140,000 in cash at the close; 
(c) $50,000 payable as follows: 
(i) $50,000* on or before March 15, 1982? and 
(ii) $100,000 on or before September 1, 1982, 
plus interest at 11 percent per annum on the unpaid balance 
from the date of close, payable with and in addition to each 
principal payment. 
1.2 Upon the close of this Agreement, John and 
Hal shall execute and deliver to Dee and Jay promissory notes 
to be in the form and substance of Exhibits "A" and HB" 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference (the 
"Promissory Notes") representing the unpaid balances described 
in paragraph 1*1 hereof. 
1.3 As additional consideration, John and Hal 
on behalf of BWC shall convey to each Dee and Jay good and 
marketable title, insured by a title policy or policies at 
the expense of John and Hal, to 20 lots located in Durango 
Estates, Subdivisions 1, 2 or 3, LaPlata County, Colorado, 
which lots are more particularly set forth on Exhibits " C 
and "D" attached hereto. Upon the close of this Agreement, 
John and Hal shall execute the deeds and any other instruments 
necessary to effect said conveyances. Dee and Jay hereby 
agree to grant John and Hal a first right of refusal to 
purchase any of said lots offered for sale. 
2. Assignment of Interests. 
At the close Dee and Jay shall assign to John and Hal, 
respectively, all right, title and interest in Dee and Jay's 
interests in BWC and the underlying assets. At the close 
John and Hal, respectively, shall assume in writing all 
partnership liabilities for which Dee and Jay, respectively, 
coo 
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were previously liable, including without limitation any 
liability in respect to the airplane owned by the partnership, 
in respect to a debt to Silver King Bank, in respect to real 
estate purchase agreements and in respect to any requirements 
of HUD or the HUD report; and shall indemnify Dee and Jay, 
respectively, from any and all liability, loss or damages, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs Dee and Jay 
may suffer as a result of claims, demands, lawsuits, costs 
or judgments against them arising from their participation 
in BWC or the activities of BWC from and after the date 
hereof. 
3. Representations and Warranties. 
Dee and Jay represent and warrant to John and Hal 
that they are the owners of the BWC interests sold hereunder 
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and there are 
no restrictions with respect to the transferability of the 
BWC interests to John and Hal. 
John and Hal represent and warrant to Dee and Jay 
that they are aware of no claims, liabilities or obligations 
of BWC other than those heretofore disclosed to Dee and Jay. 
4. Closing. 
The closing shall take place on or before March , 
1981, in Park City, Utah, at such time and place agreed upon 
by the parties. The parties each agree to execute such 
documents as are reasonably required by the other party to 
effectuate the transactions described herein. 
5. Conditions to Closing. 
The closing of this transaction is conditioned upon 
John and Hal being satisfied with the status of title to 
the real property held by BWC and any property subject to 
contracts receivable held by BWC. In this respect, John 
and Hal are causing BWC to obtain preliminary title reports 
to the real property held by it. Dee and Jay agree that 
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prior to or after closing, upon request, they shall execute 
any &oc^ r^aeTvts reasonably requina by a title company to 
cause BWC to have clear title to all of its real property 
and property that has been sold to third parties and is 
subject to a contract receivable. 
The representations and warranties of each of the 
parties are true and correct at the time of closing and they 
shall survive the closing. 
If any of the foregoing conditions are not fulfilled 
at the time of closing and the failure thereof is not due to 
a breach of a representation/ warranty or agreement of John 
or Hal, then John and Hal shall be entitled, upon written 
notice to Dee and Jay, anytime after the scheduled 
closing date, but not later than one month after the date 
hereof, to declare this Agreement null and void and to 
receive back their earnest money deposits. If this Agreement 
does not close and the failure to close is due to a breach 
by John or Hal of a representation or warranty or an agree-
ment of theirs hereunder, Dee and Jay's sole remedy shall 
be to declare this Agreement null and void and to forfeit 
John and Hal's earnest money deposit, 
6. Announcement. 
Dee and Jay shall cause an appropriate announcement 
to be made by them substantially to the effect that they 
have completely disposed of their interests as a partner 
in BWC. Dee and Jay shall also cause appropriate withdrawal 
of their registration as a member of BWC under the Trade 
Name Act, Names of Trading Firms Act or any other similar 
act under which they are registered as a member of BWC. 
John and Hal shall execute the necessary documents to effect 
such announcements and withdrawal. 
00° 
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7. Litigation. 
If any litigation arises in connection with this 
Agreement, the prevailing party to such litigation shall be 
reimbursed by the other party for all costs and expenses 
of such litigation, including reasonable attorneys1 fees 
to be fixed by the court, and the amount of such costs and 
expenses shall be added to the amount of the judgment. 
8
* Notices. 
All written notices which are to be given under this 
Agreement by either party shall be delivered or mailed, 
certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to 
the addresses stated below, or to such other address as 
shall be designated in writing. Service by mail shall be 
deemed complete within ninety-six (96) hours after deposit 
in the United States Postal Service mail. 
9. Merger. 
This Agreement contains the sole and entire agreement 
and understanding of the parties with respect to the entire 
subject matter hereof. Any and all prior discussions, 
negotiations, commitments and understandings relating thereto 
are hereby merged herein. This Agreement cannot be changed 
or terminated orally. 
10. Invalidity. 
If any term or provision of this Agreement or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance shall, to 
any extent, be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of 
this Agreement or the application of such term or provision 
to persons or circumstances other than those as to which 
it is held invalid or unenforeable shall not be affected 
thereby, and each term and provision of this Agreement shall 
be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent permitted by 
law. 
-6-
11. Binding Effect. 
All of the provisions of this Agreement (including 
all agreements, representations and warranties) shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties 
hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
*
2
' Construction. 
All rights and obligations of the parties shall be 
governed, construed and enforced according to the laws and 
the decisions of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement as of the date above first/written. 
Address 
35SEN " ~7T 
2 l&o ClJUK £6aJ? 
.#> (Acq- jfyo7(f 
MARTIN JAY (CJJMSJIANSEN 
A d d r e s s : ZJ^C?ST ^ O ^ ^ O J C Q ^ "^rcL 
jmk A i WESTMAN 
Address: P. 0. Box 2291 
Park City, Utah 84 060 
/ / , 4 / 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR 
Arresss 
-GO** 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before 
me this 2P day of March, 1981, by Dee W. Christiansen, 
dry Public Nota  
Residing at 
My commission expires: 1?/?/p4 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before 
me this day of March, 1981, by Martin Jay Christiansen. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
*/*/'* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
r : SS 
COUNTY OF ^  Uwi I T~) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
i i . ^ < 
T7-L 
th s ^ a^ o f March, 1981, by John A. Westman. 
ta±y Public No r
Residing a 
My commission expires: JQA\r? ]%1^ 
-.r,Q\$ 
OJO 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$75,000.00 ~}k**c&- 3o 1981 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, John A. Westman and Harold W* 
Taylor, jointly and severally, promise to pay to Dee W. 
Christiansen, in lawful money of the United States of America, 
the principal sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) 
plus interest as set forth below, payable in the following 
installments: 
DATE 
March 15, 1982 
September 1, 1982 
AMOUNT 
$25,000.00 
$50,000.00 
with interest at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum 
from the date hereof on the unpaid balance, payable with 
and in addition to each principal installment. 
This Note may be prepaid in whole or in part at any 
time, without penalty. 
The entire remaining principal balance of this Note, 
with interest thereon, shall immediately become due and 
payable at the option of the holder hereof without notice 
to or demand upon the Maker, unless otherwise provided, 
upon the occurrence of the following events of default: 
(1) Upon the default in payment hereunder of any 
installment of principal or interest, or both, for more than 
thirty (30) days after written notice of such default sent 
by registered or certified mail, or hand delivered, has 
been received by the Maker. 
(2) The Maker hereof makes an application for the 
appointment of a receiver, files a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy, has filed against him an involuntary petition 
in bankruptcy and said petition is not dismissed within 
ninety (90) days, or admits in writing an inability to pay 
his debts generally as they become due. 
Diligence, grace, demand, presentment for payment, 
exhibition of this Note, protest, notice of protest, notice 
of dishonor and notice of nonpayment are hereby waived. 
Maker promises to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred 
by the holder hereof in connection with the collection of 
this Note whether or not suit is brought. It is 
expressly agreed that the acceptance by the holder of this 
Note of any performance which does not comply strictly 
with the terms of this Note shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of any right to the holder. 
a/, Aim 
John A -™—^ 
{MAUM/J 
Westman 
1 
Harold W. Taylor 
EXHIBIT MA" 
G0: QG*
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
^IOUH^UC^ $75,000.00 rK^iy^U.^O , 1981 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, John A. Westman and Harold W. 
Taylor, jointly and severally, promise to pay to Martin Jay 
Christiansen, in lawful money of the United States of America, 
the principal sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), 
plus interest as set forth below, payable in the following 
installments: 
DATE AMOUNT 
March 15, 1982 $25,000.00 
September 1, 1982 $50,000.00 
with interest at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum 
from the date hereof on the unpaid balance, payable with 
and in addition to each principal installment. 
This Note may be prepaid in whole or in part at any 
time, without penalty. 
The entire remaining principal balance of this Note, 
with interest thereon, shall immediately become due and 
payable at the option of the holder hereof without notice 
to or demand upon the Maker, unless otherwise provided, 
upon the occurrence of the following events of default: 
(1) Upon the default in payment hereunder of any 
installment of principal or interest, or both, for more than 
thirty (30) days after written notice of such default sent 
by registered or certified mail, or hand delivered, has 
been received by the Maker. 
(2) The Maker hereof makes an application for the 
appointment of a receiver, files a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy, has filed against him an involuntary petition 
in bankruptcy and said petition is not dismissed within 
ninety (90) days, or admits in writing an inability to pay 
his debts generally as they become due. 
Diligence, grace, demand, presentment for payment, 
exhibition of this Note, protest, notice of protest, notice 
of dishonor and notice of nonpayment are hereby waived. 
Maker promises to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection, including reasonable attorneys'fees incurred 
by the holder hereof in connection with the collection of 
this Note whether or not suit is brought. It is 
expressly agreed that the acceptance by the holder of this 
Note of any performance which does not comply strictly 
with the terms of this Note shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of any right to the holder. 
•/({• Alj/fic^r 
EXHIBIT 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
i SS 
COUNTY OF SV/w^, r) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before 
me this 1>V ~~ day of March, 1981, by Harold W. Taylor. 
Nota^Y Publi 
Residing at 
My commission expires: 
-iff* 
M. JAY CHRISTIANSEN 
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DEE W„ CHRISTIANSEN 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
ADDENDUM E 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$75,000.00 ^fr**^- 3 P _, 1981 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, John A. Westman and Harold W. 
Taylor, jointly and severally, promise to pay to Dee W. 
Christiansen, in lawful money of the United States of America, 
the principal sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), 
plus interest as set forth below, payable in the following 
installments: 
DATE AMOUNT 
March 15, 1982 $25,000.00 
September 1, 1982 $50,000.00 
with interest at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum 
from the date hereof on the unpaid balance, payable with 
and in addition to each principal installment. 
This Note may be prepaid in whole or in part at any 
time, without penalty. 
The entire remaining principal balance of this Note, 
with interest thereon, shall immediately become due and 
payable at the option of the holder hereof without notice 
to or demand upon the Maker, unless otherwise provided, 
upon the occurrence of the following events of default: 
(1) Upon the default in payment hereunder of any 
installment of principal or interest, or both, for more than 
thirty (30) days after written notice of such default sent 
by registered or certified mail, or hand delivered, has 
been received by the Maker. 
(2) The Maker hereof makes an application for the 
appointment of a receiver, files a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy, has filed against him an involuntary petition 
in bankruptcy and said petition is not dismissed within 
ninety (90) days, or admits in writing an inability to pay 
his debts generally as they become due. 
Diligence, grace, demand, presentment for payment, 
exhibition of this Note, protest, notice of protest, notice 
of dishonor and notice of nonpayment are hereby waived. 
Maker promises to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection, including reasonable attorneys'fees incurred 
by the holder hereof in connection with the collection of 
this Note whether or not suit is brought. It is 
expressly agreed that the acceptance by the holder of this 
Note of any performance which does not comply strictly 
with the terms of this Note shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of any right to the holder. 
Jpftn ,A. "Westman d 
Harold W. Taylor / 
EXHIBIT "B. 
0 0 0 ^ 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
^IIC+CHUC $75,000.00 /7C4^UC^>0 1981 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, John A. Westman and Harold W. 
Taylor, j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y , promise to pay to Martin Jay 
Chr i s t iansen , in lawful money of the United S ta tes of America, 
the p r i n c i p a l sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dol lars ($75,000*00) , 
p lus i n t e r e s t as s e t f o r t h below, payable in the fo l l owing 
i n s t a l l m e n t s ; 
DATE AMOUNT 
March 15, 1982 $25,000.00 
September 1, 1982 $50,000.00 
with interest at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum 
from the date hereof on the unpaid balance, payable with 
and in addition to each principal installment. 
This Note may be prepaid in whole or in part at any 
time, without penalty<, 
The entire remaining principal balance of this Note, 
with interest thereon, shall immediately become due and 
payable at the option of the holder hereof without notice 
to or demand upon the Maker, unless otherwise provided, 
upon the occurrence of the following events of default: 
(1) Upon the default in payment hereunder of any 
installment of principal or interest, or both, for more than 
thirty (30) days after written notice of such default sent 
by registered or certified mail, or hand delivered, has 
been received by the Maker. 
(2) The Maker hereof makes an application for the 
appointment of a receiver, files a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy, has filed against him an involuntary petition 
in bankruptcy and said petition is not dismissed within 
ninety (90) days, or admits in writing an inability to pay 
his debts generally as they become due. 
Diligence, grace, demand, presentment for payment, 
exhibition of this Note, protest, notice of protest, notice 
of dishonor and notice of nonpayment are hereby waived. 
"Maker promises to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection, including reasonable attorneys'fees incurred 
by the holder hereof in connection with the collection of 
this Note whether or not suit is brought. It is 
expressly agreed that the acceptance by the holder of this 
Note of any performance which does not comply strictly 
with the terms of this Note shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of any right to the holder. 
EXHIBIT "C" 
0^002» 
ADDENDUM F 
Stote of Colorado La W<*o County 
When recorded, mail to: 
Mark A, Larsen 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
ASSIGNMENT 
THIS ASSIGNMENT is entered into between JOHN A. WESTMAN 
("Westman"), HAROLD W. TAYLOR ("Taylor"), BWC DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, DURANGO ESTATES PARTNERS, on the one hand, and DEE 
W. CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN JAY CHRISTIANSEN (sometime 
referred to as the "Christiansens"), on the other hand, as 
follows: 
1. Westman and Taylor entered into an Agreement dated 
March 20, 1981 (the "Agreement") with Dee W. Christiansen and 
Martin Jay Christiansen; under the terms of the Agreement, 
Westman and Taylor purchased from Dee W. Christiansen and 
Martin Jay Christiansen the latters1 interest in BWC Develop-
ment Company. 
2. In conjunction with the execution of the Agreement, 
Westman and Taylor delivered to Dee W. Christiansen a Promis-
sory Note dated March 30, 1981, in the amount of $75,000.00 
("Promissory Note I"). 
3* In conjunction with the execution of the Agreement, 
Westman and Taylor delivered to Martin Jay Christiansen a 
Promissory Note dated March 30, 1981, in the amount of 
$75,000.00 ("Promissory Note II") (collectively Promissory 
Note I and Promissory Note II are referred to as the 
"Promissory Notes"). 
4. Paragraph 1.1 of the Agreement required Westman and 
Taylor to pay Dee W. Christiansen and Martin Jay Christiansen 
a total of $300,000.00, $150,000.00 at the closing, 
$50,000.00 on or before March 15, 1982, and $100,000.00 on or 
before September 1, 1982, together with interest at the rate 
of eleven percent per annum on the unpaid balance beginning 
on March 30, 1981, the date of the closing. 
5. Under the terms of Promissory Note I, Westman and 
Taylor are required to pay to Dee W. Christiansen $25,000.00 
on March 15, 1982, and $50,000.00 on September 1, 1982, plus 
interest at the rate of eleven percent per annum; under the 
terms of Promissory Note II, Western and Taylor are required 
to pay Martin Jay Christiansen $25,000.00 on March 15, 1982 
and $50,000.00 on September 1, 1982, plus interest at the 
rate of eleven percent per annum. 
C00123 
SNOW, CHHISTBNSBN & MABTINEAU 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE. ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 3 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 IO 
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6* Westman and Taylor paid the Christiansens 
$150,000.00 at the closing of the sale and, on August 15, 
1982, the sum of $40,000,000, but no other sums. 
7. Westman and Taylor agree and admit they are now in 
default under the terms of the Agreement and the Notes due to 
their failure to pay, in a timely manner or otherwise, the 
remaining sums due. 
8. Westman and Taylor agree and admit that as of May 1, 
1984, they will owe the Christiansens principal and interest 
in the sum of $157,727.10. 
9. As a result of Westmanfs and Taylor's default in the 
payment of the amounts due under the Agreement and Notes, it 
was necessary for the Christiansens to initiate a lawsuit in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, Civil No. C83-8632, requiring the Christiansens to 
retain and pay an attorney to file said lawsuit. 
10. Paragraph 7 of the Agreement and the terms of the 
Promissory Notes require Westman and Taylor to pay reasonable 
attorneys1 fees incurred in connection with the collection of 
the amounts due under the Agreement or the Notes. 
11. Westman and Taylor agree to pay the Christiansens 
reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,000.00 which 
have been incurred to date in conjunction with the collection 
of amounts due under the Agreement and Promissory Notes. 
12. Westman and Taylor, individually and through part-
nerships known as BWC Development Company and Durango Estate 
Partners, own the following real property located in 
La Plata, Colorado, more particularly described as follows: 
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13. Lot 2, Subdivision 1, Unit 1, Block B; 
14. Lot 5, Subdivision 1, Unit 1, Block A; 
all located within Durango Estates Subdivision as filed 
for record in the office of the Clerk and Recorder, La 
Plata County, Colorado. 
13. Westman and Taylor, together with BWC Development 
Company and Durango Estate Partners, entered into an Option 
Agreement dated August 10, 1983/ with Niles Thim Trust No, 
3001 and Durango Estates Trust; under the terms of this 
Option Agreement^ a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," 
on or before April 9, 1984, the optionees may purchase from 
Westman and Taylor, and the other optionors, fourteen lots of 
real property described in paragraph 12, above, for the sum 
of $20,000.00 per lot. Westman and Taylor hereby represent 
and warrant that said Option Agreement is in full force and 
effect and that they have not heretofore and will not assign 
or transfer any of their rights or interests therein, direct 
or indirect, to any other party until Christiansens have been 
paid in ful%l. 
14. The Christiansens have agreed to accept an Assign-
ment of amounts payable from the Option Agreement and sale of 
the real property described in the Option Agreement and in 
paragraph 12, above, as collateral for the amounts due the 
Christiansens under the terms of the Agreement and Promissory 
Notes. 
15. On September 16, 1983, Goff Engineering & Surveying, 
Inc. and, on October 14, 1983, Dodson Engineering Products, 
filed mechanic's liens totaling $39,184 against property 
owned by the Christiansens in Durango Estates; Westman and 
Taylor agree to have these liens discharged by May 9, 1984 or 
to assign a sum in the amount of $39,184 from the proceeds of 
the Option Agreement and the sale of the property described 
in paragraph 12 to Snow, Christensen & Martineau, to be held 
in escrow, to insure the payment of the amounts secured by 
these liens. 
16. Jay Martin Christiansen owns Lot 4, Subdivision 3, 
Unit B, Block 2 in Durango Estates Subdivision, through the 
middle of which Westman and Taylor placed a roadway; Westman 
and Taylor agree to deliver to Martin Jay Christiansen a 
Warranty Deed conveying to him Lot 6, Subdivision 3, Unit B, 
Block 2, in Durango Estates Subdivision, free and clear of 
all liens and/or encumbrances; Martin Jay Christiansen agrees 
-3-
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to convey, through Quitclaim Deed, within a reasonable time 
after Westman and Taylor deliver the preceding Warranty Deed, 
to Westman and Taylor, Lot 4, Subdivision 3, Unit Bc Block 2 
in Durango Estates Subdivision; in the event Westman and 
Taylor fail to deliver the preceding Warranty Deed to Martin 
Jay Christiansen by February 15, 1984, then they agree to pay 
Martin Jay Christiansen $20,000.00 for Lot 4, Subdivision 3, 
Unit B, Block 2 in Durango Estates Subdivision and to assign 
to Martin Jay Christiansen the additional sum of $20,000.00 
from the proceeds of the Option Agreement and the sale of the 
real property described in paragraph 12; Martin Jay 
Christiansen will deliver to Taylor and Westman a Quitclaim 
Deed for said lot upon receipt of the $20,000.00. 
17. Westman and Taylor hereby irrevocably assign to the 
Christiansens the sum of $158,727.10 from proceeds of the 
Option Agreement and the sale of the lots described in the 
Option Agreement and in paragraph 12, above, plus any amounts 
to Snow, Christensen & Martineau, in escrow, necessary to 
insure the payment of the amounts secured by liens as set 
forth in paragraph 15, plus any amounts to Martin Jay 
Christiansen required by the provisions of paragraph 16. 
18. This Assignment is made as collateral for the 
amounts due to the Christiansens under the terms of the 
Agreement and the Promissory Notes and is not intended in any 
way to prejudice or waive the Christiansens1 rights under 
either the Agreement, the Promissory Notes, or the lawsuit 
described in paragraph 9, above. 
19. If the optionees exercise the Option and pay to the 
Christiansens the amount described in paragraph 17, the 
Christiansens agree to dismiss the lawsuit described in 
paragraph 9, above. 
20. To secure the payment of all amounts due under the 
terms of the Promissory Notes, the Agreement and this Assign-
ment, by February 27, 1984, Westman and Taylor agree to 
deliver to the Christiansens or their attorneys a Trust Deed 
on the real property described in Exhibit "B," attached 
hereto, in a form acceptable to the Christiansens, in their 
sole discretion; in the event Westman and Taylor fail to 
deliver the preceding Trust Deed by February 27, 1984, they 
agree to have judgment entered against them in Civil No. 
C-83-8632, in the amount due under the terms of the Promis-
sory Notes plus any amounts due under paragraphs 15 and 16 of 
this Assignment upon the filing of an Affidavit by Martin Jay 
-4-
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Christiansen or Dee W. Christiansen setting forth the amount 
due; Westman and Taylor warrant that the property decoribcd 
in Tiirhihit- "fi" in not nnhjrrt to nny rp-rilmj ii ill honarrf whir 
**ould provont its rtpvalopnenL luL6 felLUei lumiueruiUl ur 
g-eoideuLial property-^  
21. Westman and Taylor warrant that the real property 
described on Exhibit "B" is not encumbered in any amount 
exceeding $125,000.00 as of February 27, 1984. 
22. Westman and Taylor agree that they will not modify 
or alter the terms of the Option Agreement without the prior 
express, written consent of the Christiansens. 
23. The parties agree that the Christiansens may record 
a copy of this Assignment with the County Recorderfs office 
for the County of La Plata, Colorado. 
24. Westman and Taylor agree to pay to the Christiansens 
the reasonable costs associated with collecting any amounts 
due under this Assignment, including reasonable attorneys1 
fees and costs, whether or not a lawsuit is initiated. 
25. Westman and Taylor agree and warrant that they have 
read the preceding Assignment and understand its terms. 
26. This Assignment becomes effective only upon its 
execution by all parties. 
DATED this H day of February, 1984. 
Subscribed and sworn to me this A X day of February, 
1984. 
H9TARY PUBLIC * T T 
Residing at: ^cJttrtkJk*- CJUT^ U^W 
My Commission Expires: 
& * " • • < • . 
wool"'7 
i » ou> \r> 
Harold W. Taylor 
Subscribed and sworn to me t h i s /i^ay of 
1984. *~"^ 
*s 
My Commission Expires: 
^/>... 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ » . 
R e s i d i n g a t : yf*^>.*«-^-^ LsUL*~£s 
BWC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
ohn A. Westman 
ts General Manager 
Harold We Taylor 
Its General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
John A, Westman, being first duly sworn, deposes and says 
that he is a general partner in BWC Development Company; that 
he has read the preceding Assignment; and that he is author-
ized to enter into the assignment on behalf of BWC Develop-
ment Company. 
-6-
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Subscribed to and sworn before me this A mL day of 
February, 1984. 
OtARY PUBLIC 
a-OM J-*+ 
hiding . t . ItJbtr&JL Cj, fQ-faJ 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
Harold W. Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says that he is a general partner in BWC Development Company; 
that he has read the preceding Assignment; and that he is 
authorized to enter into the assignment on behalf of BWC 
Development Company. 
Subscribed to and sworn before me this day of 
B#HpT^HHF7 / 1984* 
NOTARY PUBLIC . -/ •/ 
Residing at: / ^ o * <•^-<. LCE-c-f^, 
My Commission Expires: **'7-
* / 
-7- <oVJ iUi^
9 
b*u-9»e&. b l V U ft 
~mL.I5 
DURANGO ESTATES PARTNERS 
A. Westman 
n e r a l P a r t n e r 
4/JAAJ^ 
Harold W. Tay 
I t s General Partiyfe 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
% S S c 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John A. Westman, being first duly sworn, deposes and says 
that he is a general partner in Durango Estates Partners; 
that he has read the preceding Assignment; and that he is 
authorized to enter into the assignment on behalf of BWC 
Development Company• 
Subscribed to and sworn before me this 2*1- day of 
February, 1984. 
X -0-flOO 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Harold W. Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says that he is a general partner in Durango Estates 
Partners; that he has read the preceding Assignment; and that 
he is authorized to enter into the assignment on behalf of 
BWC Development Company. 
-8- j0l3C 
BUTTON* ^ ^ 5 
Subscribed to and sworn before me this 
February, 1984. 
day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
Dee W. Christiansen 
1984. 
Subscribed and sworn to me this J? 3 day of February, 
^ Jh 
^ c ? . t)l
Xr
 ' 
TARY PUBLIC
 n „ . v * . . A , , Uiding at: JUjtf <%j. ft! /)4U 
My Commission Expires: 
l if Hi QC 
Martin Jai(j^i££^tiansen 
C^ w/>* 
Subscribed and sworn to me this \~7"VA day of February/'; -: 
1984. APO.< v-V/ V r 
aZ. 
NOTARY PUBLIC Q . . 
Residing at: S^xa^d,. CcrTJ 
My Commission Expires: T 
-9- VjO O l ^ 
OPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS OPTION AGREEMENT, dated this ay of August, 
1983, is entered into by and between JOHN A. WESTMAH f. indivi-
dually and Ho W. TAYLOR, individually, and JOHN A. UESTMAN 
and H. W. TAYLOR as general partners of BWC DEVELOPMENT, 
a general partnership and DURANGO ESTATES PARTERS, a general 
partnership, hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Optionor" and NILES THK TRUST t 3001 and DURANGO ESTATES 
TRUST, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Optionee". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That for and in consideration of of the sum of Ten 
Dollars ($10.00), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged 
and in further consideration of the certain agreement between 
the above parties for the sale of Durango Estates Subdivision, 
the parties agree as follows: 
A. OPTION GRANT 
Optionor hereby irrevocably grants to Optionee the 
exclusive option to purchase from said Optionor, on and subject 
to the terms and conditions herein contained, th-e following 
real property located in the County of La Plata, State of 
Colorado , to-wit: 
1. Lot 3, Subdivision 3, Unit B, Block 1; 
2. Lot 3, Subdivision 3, Unit B, Block 2; 
3. Lot 7, Subdivision 2, Unit 4t Block J; 
U. Lot 6, Subdivision 2, Unit 4, Block J; 
COLOPADD '.-.'"3 7.'" 
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5. Lot 5, Subdivision 1 
6 Lot 4, Subdivision 1 
7. Lot 3, Subdivision 1 
8. Lot 4, Subdivision 1 
9. Lot 5, Subdivision 1 
10. Lot 8, Subdivision 1 
11. Lot 3. Subdivision 1 
12. Lot 8, Subdivision 1 
13. Lot 2, Subdivision 1 
Unit 3, Block A 
Unit 3, Block A 
Unit 3, Block A 
Unit 3, Block B 
Unit 3, Block C 
Unit 2, Block A 
Unit 2, Block A 
Unit 1, Block E 
Unit 1 , Block B 
Unit 1 , Block A 14. Lot 5, Subdivision 1 
all located within Durango Estates Subdivision as filed for 
record in the office of the Clerk and Recorder, La Plata 
County, Colorado. 
B. TERM OF OPTION 
This option shall commence on the date of execution 
hereof and continue until midnight on the 9th day of April, 
1984, and may be exercised at any time on or before the 
expiration. 
C. EXERCISE OF OPTION 
If the option is exercised in accordance with the 
terms hereof, Optionor shall sell and convey the land to 
Optionee on and subject to the terms contained herein. 
D. PURCHASE PRICE 
The total purchase price for the real property 
described above shall be Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
-2-
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:>er lot. Payment shall be made in cash at closing. It is 
expressly understood•between the parties that Optionee 
Is granted an option to exercise f during the eight (8) month 
>eriodf any one or all of said lots, there being an express 
>ntent to have separate options for each lot. 
CLOSING 
1. The closing on the option shall be within thirty 
30) days of notification to Optionor from Optionee of his 
ntention to exercise the option. 
2. At closing Optionor shall convey to Optionee 
lear title to said lots free and clear of all liens an 
ncumbrances. 
3. All prorations shall be made to date of closing. 
. RECORDING OF OPTION 
This Option Agreement shall be recorded in the public 
ecords of the Clerk and Recorder of La Plata County, Colorado, 
nd shall become a lien upon the real property described herein 
ntil the option is exercised or terminated pursuant to the 
erms hereof. 
. ASSIGNMENT 
This option may be assigned by Optionee in its 
iscretion . 
co 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have set their hands 
and seal on the dayand year first above written. 
BWC DEVELOPMENT/COMPANY 
Ha: 
by John A. Westman 
Attorney-in-Fact 
Taylor 
B. W. Taylor, bfA- fiff , V> 
John A. Westman/ / fy ' 
Attorney-in-Fact 
DURANGO ESTATES PARTNERS 
a ge^ nera^ l partnership 
% 
Hal Taylor, b/ A 
John A. Westman ' 
Attorney-in-Fact 
OPTIONEE: 
NILES THIH TRUST #3001 
DURANGO ESTATES TRUST 
COLORADO L A K E ^ S O R T S , INC. 
a C o l o r a d o c o r p o r a t i o n .< ^, 
T r u s t e e/P / 
• a t i o a .^, ^ 
* i L e V *HV«Tbin 4 . * <• <•" ' 
£? r eS i d e n t 
• H -
W •GOl'-^
5 
DEED OF TRUST 
THIS INDENTURE, Made this FOURTEENTH d*> of FEBRUARY .1°84 .between 
JOHN A, WESIMAN, %jhose address i s 1176 Lucky John Drive, Park City, Utah, HAROLD 
W. TAYLOR, whose address i s 5 Si lver t>>een Court, Park City, Utah, BWC EEVEDDP-
WENT COMPANY, whose address i s ?• O. BCDC 2291, Park City, Utah, and DURANGO ESTA3ES 
whose address* p . o . Box 2291, Park City, Utah 
l « r l i e s of the Hi* p ^ . a ^ the r\iWic Trustee of j ^ PXAIA County of jj{ PLATA 
ft the State of Colorado. party of the second pan, Witnesseih: 
THAT, WHEREAS.Tbesaid John A. Westaan md Harold w. Taylor 
dated March 30, 1981, 
lift V e executed promissory note »/3tKB6W|»LUUUWl>aClt)di. for the pnnerpal sum of 
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY 1KXJSAND DQUARS ($150,000.00)- 2SHPt# 
f»>abie to the order of Qgg We CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN JAY CHRISTIANSEN 
whose address r> ga i t Lake City, Utah 
after the date hereof, with interest thereon from the date thereof 
at the rate of e l e v e n percent per annum, payable $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 Crt OCT b e f o r e March 1? 1 9 8 2 , 
and $100,000.00 on or before September 1, 1982, together with interest at the 
rate of eleven percent per annum 
AND WHEREAS. The said part i e s of the first pan a r e desirous of secunnf payment of the 
principal and interest of said promissory notejm whose hands soever the said notes or an) of them may be. 
NOW. THEREFORE. The said part ies of the first pan. in consideration of the premises and for the purpose aforesaid, 
do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey UMO the said part) of the second pan in trust forever, the foito«inf described 
propeny. situate in the County of La P l a t a .Slate of Coiorado. torn it: 
The property i s described in Exhib i t "A?" attached hereto and 
made a part hereof . 1?0A/r***r***4 ••** JLOTS. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
EXHIBIT A 
nouiv 
The following real property located in La Plata, Colorado, 
more particularly described as follows: 
1. 
2 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
Lot 
3, 
3, 
7, 
6, 
5, 
4, 
3, 
4, 
5, 
8, 
3, 
8, 
2, 
5, 
Subdivision 3, 
Subdivision 3, 
Subdivision 2, 
Subdivision 2, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Subdivision 1, 
Unit B, 
Unit B, 
Unit 4, 
Unit 4, 
Unit 3, 
Unit 3, 
Unit 3, 
Unit 3, 
Unit 3, 
Unit 2, 
Unit 2, 
Unit 1, 
Unit 1, 
Unit 1, 
Block 
Block 
Block 
Block 
Block 
Block 
Block 
Block B 
Block C 
Block A 
Block A 
Block E 
Block B 
Block A 
all located within Durango Estates Subdivision as filed 
for record in the office of the Clerk and Recorder, La 
Plata County, Colorado. 
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ADDENDUM G 
DEE CHRISTIANSEN, 
RECALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS, 
HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED 
FURTHER AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOLLAND: 
Q DEE, WHO IS MR. COMMICK? 
A HE'S AN ENGINEER IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
Q AND DO YOU KNOW WHERE HE CURRENTLY IS? 
A I HAVE NO IDEA. I HAVEN'T SEEN HIM FOR YEARS. 
Q PRIOR TO THE USE OF HIM BY B.W.C. HAD YOU EVER 
USED HIM PREVIOUSLY? 
A NO, SIR. 
Q HAD YOU KNOWN HIM PREVIOUSLY? 
A I HAD MET HIM AT A FEW PARTIES. 
Q BUT YOU HAD NEVER UTILIZED HIS SERVICE PRIOR TO 
B.W.C? 
A NO, WE HAD NEVER HAD OCCASION TO HIRE THAT TYPE 
OF AN ENGINEER BEFORE. 
Q WHERE DOES MR. STEVE GEIGER LIVE? 
A IN THOUSAND OAKS, CALIFORNIA. 
Q WHAT IS HIS OCCUPATION? 
A HE IS A REAL ESTATE BROKER, DEVELOPER. 
Q ISN'T IT TRUE ON OCTOBER OF 1980--STRIKE THAT. 
WERE YOU AWARE OF MR. GEIGER EVER PAYING ANY MONEY 
57 
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TO MR. TAYLOR FOR HIS INTEREST? 
A MR. TAYLOR'S KNOWN MR. GEIGER LONGER THAN I HAVE 
BECAUSE HE INTRODUCED HIM TO ME. AND AS IT RELATES TO HIS 
INTEREST IN WHAT? 
Q B.W.C. 
A NO, I AM NOT. 
Q NO, YOU WEREN'T AWARE THAT MR. GEIGER HAD PAID 
MR. TAYLOR $50,000.00 AS A DOWN PAYMENT ON HIS INTEREST? 
A IT'S BEEN SO MANY YEARS AGO BUT I THINK THERE 
WAS A CASHIER'S CHECK THAT WAS DELIVERED TO THE POINT OF 
A SALE IF MR. TAYLOR WERE TO AGREE TO THE TERMS . AND I DON'Tj 
REMEMBER WHAT THE TERMS WERE. AND I DON'T KNOW WHETHER 
ACTUALLY MONEY TRANSFERRED OR NOT. I'M NOT--
Q DID YOU EVER TELL MR. GEIGER NOT TO GO THROUGH 
WITH THAT TRANSACTION? 
A WE SAT AT A BREAKFAST OR LUNCHEON MEETING AT THE 
HOLIDAY INN, JOHN AND I AND HAL AND JAY, AND WE DISCUSSED 
CERTAIN OPTIONS. AND AT THAT POINT I THINK THEY REACHED 
AN IMPASSE BETWEEN THE TWO OF 'EM. 
Q WAS MR. GEIGER PRESENT? 
A I BELIEVE HE WAS, YES. 
Q YOU NEVER TOLD HIM NOT TO DO THE DEAL? 
A I THINK THE PROBLEM WAS THAT, AS I RECALL, WAS 
MOSTLY BETWEEN THE METHODOLOGY OF THE WAY THE DEAL WAS TO 
BE DONE BECAUSE MR. GEIGER WANTED TO SYNDICATE THE DEAL. 
58 
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AND MR. TAYLOR DIDN'T REALLY CARE EXCEPT MR. WESTMAN DIDN'T 
REALLY WANT TO SYNDICATE IT BECAUSE HE WANTED TO DO IT ON 
BORROWINGS RATHER THAN EQUITY INFUSION BY A SYNDICATION. 
AND I THINK THAT'S WHERE THE DEAL REALLY BROKE DOWN. 
Q SO YOU'RE NOT AWARE THAT THE $50,000.00 HAD EVER 
BEEN PAID TO MR. TAYLOR? 
A I»M NOT. 
Q DID YOU EVER TELL MR. TAYLOR THAT YOU HAD SOME 
OF THE LOTS SOLD PRIOR TO HIS ENTRANCE INTO THE B.W.C. 
PARTNERSHIP? 
A ABSOLUTELY NOT. I HAVE NEVER SOLD A LOT. 
Q YOU NEVER TOLD HIM THAT YOU HAD HAD SOME RELATIVES 
THAT WANTED, AND FRIENDS THAT WANTED LOTS IN DURANGO? 
A NO, I HAVEN'T--DON'T HAVE ANYBODY THAT LIVES IN 
DURANGO. I'D NEVER BEEN TO DURANGO UNTIL I INVESTED THE 
MONEY. 
Q DID YOU EVER TELL HIM YOU HAD SOMEBODY THAT WOULD 
WANT TO BUY SOME LOTS OVER THERE? 
A NOT THAT I RECALL, NO. 
Q YOUR PREVIOUS TESTIMONY TO ME ON CROSS-EXAMINATION) 
WAS THAT YOU HAVE NO VALUE TO THE LOTS. IS THAT NOT CORRECT?! 
A I SAID THE VALUE WAS IN QUESTION. I SAID IT WOULDJ 
BE A GREAT PICNIC PLACE OR IT COULD BE A VERY NICE 
SUBDIVISION DEPENDING ON WHETHER IT GETS IMPROVED OR NOT. 
Q BUT WHAT WAS THE VALUE IN 1981 OF THOSE LOTS? 
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1 DEE AND JAY WERE PLANNING ON SELLING A LOT OF THEIR LOTS 
2 TO THEIR RELATIVES. NOW, I DON'T KNOW THE NUMBER ON THAT 
3 BUT THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO SELL THE LOTS TO THEIR 
4 RELATIVES. 
5 Q DID THEY EVER PUT ANY KIND OF BALL PARK FIGURE 
6 ON THE NUMBER? 
7 A THE NUMBER I RECALL IS 30 OR ^0 OR SOME NUMBER 
8 LIKE THAT. 
9 Q DID THEY EVER SELL ANY LOTS TO ANY OF THEIR 
10 FRIENDS AND RELATIVES WHILE THEY WERE INVOLVED IN B.W.C.? 
11 A NO. 
12 Q DID MR. WESTMAN SELL ANY OF--DID THEY CLOSE ON 
13 THOSE 130 LOTS THAT WERE REPRESENTED? 
14 A NO. 
15 Q HOW MANY LOTS DID MR. WESTMAN SELL? 
16 A I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PUT AN EXACT NUMBER ON 
17 IT. I'D SAY LESS THAN 10. 
18 Q I CALL YOUR( ATTENTION TO OCTOBER OF 1980. DID 
19 YOU ATTEMPT TO SELL YOUR INTEREST AT THAT TIME? 
20 A YES. 
21 Q WHEN WAS THAT? 
22 A SOME TIME IN OCTOBER OF 1980. 
23 Q AND WHO WERE YOU TRYING TO SELL IT TO? 
24 A A PERSON NAMED STEVE GEIGER. 
25
 ' Q AND COULD YOU KIND OF DESCRIBE WHAT WENT ON 
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1 BETWEEN YOU AND MR. GEIGER? 
2 MR. PANZER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. IT CALLS 
3 FOR A NARRATIVE. WE OUGHT TO HAVE SOME FOUNDATION IF HE'S 
4 GOING TO TALK ABOUT CONVERSATIONS. 
5 JUDGE BILLINGS: OVERRULED. 
6 A (BY THE WITNESS) GEIGER CAME TO ME AND SAID THAT 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
HE WOULD LIKE TO BUY MY QUARTER INTEREST OF B.W.C. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) WHAT WAS YOUR REPLY? 
A I, OF COURSE, SAID I'M WILLING TO SELL. 
Q DID YOU SET A PRICE? 
A WE SET A PRICE. 
Q WHAT WAS THAT PRICE? 
A $350,000.00. 
Q WAS THAT TO BE PAID ALL AT ONCE? 
A NO. 
Q HOW WAS THAT TO BE PAID? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY HOW IT WAS TO BE PAID 
NOW, BUT HE DID GIVE ME A CHECK FOR $50,000.00 WHICH I CASHED 
AND IT CLEARED. AND THEN I THINK THE REST OF IT WAS SET 
UP ON YEARLY PAYMENTS WITH SOME KIND OF INTEREST ATTACHED. 
Q AFTER YOU HAD RECEIVED THE CHECK AND CASHED IT 
WAS THERE ANY OTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. GEIGER? 
A I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING THIS AGREEMENT 
TO PAPER AND--
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1 MR. PANZER: YOUR HONOR, I'D OBJECT--THE QUESTION 
2 WAS YES OR NO. WE ARE GOING TO BE GETTING INTO, AND WE HAVE 
3 ALREADY GOTTEN INTO HEARSAY, WHAT MR. GEIGER SAID. THE 
4 QUESTION CALLED FOR WHETHER HE HAD ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS 
5 WITH MR. GEIGER AND THE ANSWER IS NON-RESPONSIVE. 
6 JUDGE BILLINGS: I WILL OVERRULE THAT OBJECTION. 
7 MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
8 A (BY THE WITNESS) STEVE GEIGER AND I THEN MET 
9 WITH JOHN WESTMAN AND DEE CHRISTIANSEN AND HIMSELF, GEIGER, 
10 AT THE HOLIDAY INN IN PARK CITY. 
11 Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) WAS JAY CHRISTIANSEN THERE? 
12 A I DO NOT RECALL. I DO NOT THINK SO. 
13 Q ALL RIGHT. WHEN WAS THAT MEETING HELD? 
14 A PARDON ME? 
15 Q WHEN WAS THAT MEETING HELD? 
16 A THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN OCTOBER OF 1980. 
17 Q HAD YOU ALREADY CASHED THE CHECK AT THAT POINT? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q ALL RIGHT. AND WHAT HAPPENED AT THAT MEETING? 
20 A WE DISCUSSED HOW WE WERE GOING TO DO THIS THING. 
21 AND GEIGER HAD SOME IDEA THAT HE WAS GOING TO MAKE IT— 
22 MR. NEMELKA: YOUR HONOR, I AM GOING TO OBJECT 
23 AS TO WHAT MR. GEIGER'S IDEA WAS OR WHAT MR. GEIGER SAID. 
24 | IT'S PURE HEARSAY. 
25 I JUDGE BILLINGS: SUSTAINED. 
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M Q CBY MR. HOLLAND) DID THE DEAL--WAS THE DEAL 
2 CANCELLED AT THIS MEETING? 
3 A YES. 
4
 Q DID YOU THINK THE DEAL HAD BEEN COMPLETED PRIOR 
5 TO THIS MEETING? 
6 A YES, I DID. 
* Q AND HOW WAS THE DEAL CANCELLED? 
8 A DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION DEE 
9 CHRISTIANSEN LOOKED AT GEIGER AND SAID, THIS IS NOT A GOOD 
10 DEAL. I DON'T WANT TO DO IT. 
11 Q AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A WELL, AT THAT POINT I WAS INFURIATED BECAUSE I 
WANTED OUT OF THE SITUATION. 
Q WHY DID YOU WANT OUT OF THE SITUATION? 
A I HAD OTHER THINGS TO DO AND I HAD SOME HEALTH 
PROBLEMS AT THE TIME AND HAD BEEN TOLD BY MY DOCTOR TO GET 
STRESS OUT OF MY LIFE. AND I JUST WANTED TO GET AWAY FROM 
IT. 
Q I SEE. WHEN WERE YOU FIRST APPROACHED ABOUT 
PURCHASING THE INTEREST OF THE CHRISTIANSENS? 
A I BELIEVE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SOME TIME AFTER 
THE 1ST OF JANUARY OF 1981. I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHEN. 
Q SO HOW MANY MONTHS AFTER THE GEIGER INCIDENT WAS 
THAT? 
A TWO OR THREE. 
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Q HOW DID THAT COME ABOUT? 
A AGAIN, JOHN WESTMAN CAME TO ME AND TOLD ME THAT 
HE WAS NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHRISTIANSENS TO BUY THEM OUT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. WERE THERE EVER ANY REPRESENTATIONS 
MADE TO YOU AS TO APPROVAL OF THE WATER OR SEWER? 
A AT THE VERY BEGINNING. 
Q WHO MADE THOSE REPRESENTATIONS? 
A AT THE VERY BEGINNING I THINK THE ENTIRE, 
BEUCHLER, WESTMAN AND CHRISTIANSENS, WERE ALL SAYING THAT 
IT WAS EMINENT THAT WE WERE GOING TO GET A SEWER APPROVAL. 
Q WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "EMINENT"? 
A WELL, IT WAS THAT FAR AWAY. 
Q IS THAT A MONTH, A YEAR, TEN YEARS? 
A WELL, HOW FAR IS THAT? 
Q I HAVE NO IDEA. 
A IT WAS WITHIN A SHORT TIME. SAY, 90 DAYS. THAT'S 
A SHORT TIME IN THAT KIND OF BUSINESS. 
Q WOULD A YEAR BE A LONG TIME? 
A NO, A YEAR WOULD BE ABOUT AVERAGE. 
Q WOULD THREE YEARS BE A LONG TIME? 
A IT WOULD BE A LONG TIME. 
Q DID THEY EVER TELL YOU OF ANY OF THE PROBLEMS 
THEY HAD EXPERIENCED IN GAINING THIS APPROVAL? 
A I WASN'T TOO MUCH AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS. I JUST 
ASSUMED THAT IT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. 
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1 AS YOU THOUGHT THEY WERE GOING TO PERFORM, ISN'T THAT RIGHT? 
2 A THAT *S TRUE. 
3 Q AND THAT'S THE REASON YOU WANTED THEM OUT OF THE 
4 PARTNERSHIP, ISN'T IT? 
5 A WELL, I HAD MORE REASONS THAN THAT. 
6 Q ONE OF THE REASONS WAS SO THAT YOU COULD GO AHEAD 
7 AND BORROW MONEY AND DEVELOP THE SUBDIVISION PERSONALLY, 
8 ISN'T THAT RIGHT? 
9 A AND PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT 
10 I PUT IN IT. 
11 Q AND JUST AFTER YOU SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT AND YOU 
12 ACQUIRED THE PARTNERSHIP INTEREST DIDN'T YOU AND MR. WESTMAN 
13 GO DOWN TO ARIZONA AND BORROW WHAT, ABOUT l.k MILLION DOLLARS 
14 TO DEVELOP THE SUBDIVISION? 
15 A ABOUT 2.5. 
16 Q 2.5. NOW, REGARDING MR. GEIGER, WHEN, AGAIN, 
17 DID THIS HAPPEN, OCTOBER, 1980? 
18 A RIGHT. 
19 Q JAY AND DEE AND JOHN WESTMAN WANTED YOU TO STAY 
20 IN THE PARTNERSHIP; IS THAT RIGHT? 
21 I A I THINK IT'S QUITE OBVIOUS. 
22 | Q AND THEY WERE YOUR PARTNERS AT THE TIME, RIGHT? 
23 I A RIGHT. 
24 I Q AND THEY WANTED YOU IN THERE BECAUSE YOU COULD 
25 | BORROW MONEY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
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1 A RIGHT. 
2 Q AND YOU KNEW OR YOU THOUGHT THAT DEE WANTED MR. 
3 GEIGER TO BE INVOLVED IN ANOTHER DEAL HE WAS DOING; IS THAT 
4 RIGHT? 
5 A WELL, HE OBVIOUSLY DID WANT HIM IN ANOTHER DEAL. 
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Q OTHER THAN THE STATEMENT THAT YOU'VE RECOUNTED 
AT THE HOLIDAY INN MEETING THAT DEE SAID TO MR. GEIGER THAT 
HE DIDN'T WANT TO DO THE DEAL, DID YOU HEAR ANY OTHER STATE-
MENTS BY DEE OR JAY REGARDING YOUR AGREEMENT WITH MR. GEIGER? 
A THERE WASN'T ANYTHING MORE TO SAY. 
Q YOU HAD NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH MR. GEIGER? 
A I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF PUTTING IT IN WRITING. 
Q YOU GAVE HIM HIS $50,000.00 BACK? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU THINK YOU HAD A BINDING CONTRACT WITH 
MR. GEIGER? 
A I THINK I WOULD HAVE IF I HAD KEPT THE $50,000.00. 
Q WHY DIDN'T YOU KEEP THE 50,000? 
A I DON'T DO BUSINESS THAT WAY. 
Q MR. TAYLOR, YOU MENTIONED THAT THE B.W.C. BORROWED 
TWO AND A HALF MILLION DOLLARS AFTER YOU BOUGHT DEE'S AND 
JAY'S INTEREST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT WAS THE COLLATERAL FOR THAT LOAN? 
A THE COLLATERAL WAS OUR ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND 
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YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: I WILL OVERRULE THE OBJECTION. 
I THINK IT'S DAMAGES OF THE LAWSUIT. 
MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR HONOR. 
A (BY THE WITNESS) I CAN'T SAY FOR SURE BUT I WOULD 
SAY IN THE VICINITY OF 80 TO $100,000.00. 
MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU. IF I MAY APPROACH THE 
WITNESS, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: CERTAINLY. 
Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) I SHOW YOU DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
10-D. HAVE YOU SEEN THAT BEFORE? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU SIGN THAT DOCUMENT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT WAS YOUR REASON FOR ENTERING INTO THAT AGREE-
MENT? 
A THIS WAS AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE l«f LOTS WHICH JOHN 
WESTMAN AND I OWNED TOGETHER TO COLLATERALIZE THE PROMISSORY 
NOTES AND WHAT WAS REMAINING ON THE PROMISSORY NOTES. 
Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS 11-D. CAN 
|YOU IDENTIFY THAT DOCUMENT? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU SIGN THAT DOCUMENT? 
A YES. 
Q TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS EITHER OF THOSE DOCUMENTS 
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BEEN RECORDED? 
A YES, THEY HAVE. 
Q WHERE WERE THEY RECORDED? 
A IN LAPLATA COUNTY, STATE OF COLORADO. 
Q HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RECORDED? 
A WELL, LOOK, I'M LOOKING AT THE RECORDING INFOR-
MATION. 
Q YOU DIDN'T PERSONALLY RECORD THEM? 
A NO. 
Q WHAT WAS YOUR REASON FOR ENTERING INTO THESE AND 
SIGNING THESE TWO DOCUMENTS? 
MR. PANZER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, IT'S 
IRRELEVANT. 
MR. HOLLAND: I DON'T THINK IT'S IRRELEVANT, YOUR 
HONOR. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT WHAT THE CONSIDERATION WAS. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: I'LL OVERRULE IT. 
MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
A (BY THE WITNESS) THE REASON I ENTERED INTO THESE 
TWO AGREEMENTS WAS TO SATISFY THE REMAINING BALANCE OF THOSE 
PROMISSORY NOTES. 
Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) HOW WOULD THAT HAVE OCCURRED? 
A WELL, WE GAVE THEM A DEED OF TRUST ON Ik LOTS 
AND THEY--IT WAS ALWAYS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WERE WE NOT 
TO PAYOFF THE REMAINING BALANCE OF THE PROMISSORY NOTES-
MR. PANZER: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY INTERJECT HERE. 
1U 
GOOSOO 
1 THE DOCUMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, IT'S PERFECTLY CLEAR AND 
2 NO AMBIGUITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. HOW THIS DOCUMENT IS 
3 TO FUNCTION IS SOMETHING THAT CAN BE DERIVED FROM THE DOCU-
4 MENT ITSELF. 
5 MR. HOLLAND: YOUR HONOR, IF THAT'S TRUE WE 
6 WOULDN'T HAVE HAD TO HAVE HIM READ FROM THE DOCUMENT 
7 PREVIOUSLY AND IF THE DOCUMENTS SPOKE FOR THEMSELVES, YOUR 
8 HONOR, IF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS REPRESENTED TO HIM 
9 IS IMPORTANT. 
10 JUDGE BILLINGS: I WILL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. 
11 PAROLE EVIDENCE. 
12 MR. HOLLAND: I DON'T WANT TO UPSET THE COURT 
13 SO I WANT TO HANDLE THIS CAREFULLY, BUT IT WOULD SEEM TO 
14 ME THAT--
15 JUDGE BILLINGS: YOU CAN CERTAINLYPROFFER WHATEVER 
16 YOU LIKE FOR THE RECORD. 
17 MR. HOLLAND: I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT AS TO WHAT 
18 THIS AGREEMENT ACCOMPLISHED. 
19 JUDGE BILLINGS: LET ME EXPLAIN SO THAT WE'RE 
20 CLEAR AND IF I'M MISUNDERSTANDING YOU CAN CORRECT ME. 
21 MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IS THAT 
22 WHEN YOU HAVE A WRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT THE TERMS OF THAT 
23 AGREEMENT CONTROL, THAT BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY TESTIMONY 
24 BY THE PARTIES WHO ENTERED INTO THAT AGREEMENT, THE WAY THEY 
25 HAVE TO FIND THAT AGREEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, IS AMBIGUOUS 
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1 COURT HAS MADE NO SUCH FINDING. 
2 MR. HOLLAND: ALL RIGHT, YOUR HONOR. 
3 JUDGE BILLINGS: WHY DON'T WE TAKE A SHORT RECESS 
4 YOU CAN TAKE A LOOK AT THAT AND SEE IF YOU WANT TO MAKE ANY 
5 ARGUMENT TO THE COURT. 
6 MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
7 JUDGE BILLINGS: COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
8 (RECESS). 
9 
10 Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) MR. TAYLOR, WERE THERE ANY 
11 REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO YOU PRIOR TO YOUR SIGNING THIS DOCU-
12 MENT THAT'S MARKED AS DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 10? 
13 A WHICH ONE IS THAT? 
14 Q THAT ONE RIGHT THERE. 
15 A YES. 
16 Q WHAT WERE THOSE REPRESENTATIONS? 
17 MR. PANZER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. SAME OBJEC-
18 TION, PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE. 
19 JUDGE BILLINGS: I'LL OVERRULE THAT BUT I WOULD 
20 SUSTAIN ONE ON FOUNDATION. BY WHOM, WHEN. 
21 I MR. HOLLAND: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU VERY MUCH, 
22 |YOUR HONOR. 
23 I Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) WHEN WERE THOSE REPRESENTATIONS 
24 MADE? 
25 I A AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THIS DOCUMENT 
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1 Q GUIDO TOLD YOU THAT THEY OWNED THE LOTS? 
2 A BECAUSE HE HAD DONE, YOU KNOW, THAT WE DID NOT 
3 OWN THE LOT. 
4 Q WHAT I WANT TO KNOW IS WHO TOLD YOU ORIGINALLY 
5 THAT B.W.C. OWNED THAT LOT? 
6 A NOBODY TOLD ME THAT WE SOLD IT. 
7 Q DOES MR. RINGWOOD STILL OWE YOU ANY MONEY ON 
8 ACCOUNT OF THAT SALE OF THE PROPERTY DOWN THERE? 
9 A NO. 
10 Q NOW, IN YOUR ESTIMATION WAS IT IN JAY'S AND DEE'S 
U ECONOMIC INTEREST TO KEEP YOU IN B.W.C. INSTEAD OF ALLOWING 
J2 YOU TO SELL IT TO GEIGER? 
13 A THERE'S NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. 
14 Q THANK YOU. ONE MORE QUESTION. ACTUALLY, SEVERAL 
15 MORE QUESTIONS. I MISSED ONE LINE OF, AND IT DEPENDS, I 
16 SUPPOSE, ON THE COURT'S VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF PAROLE 
17 EVIDENCE RULE TO THIS ASSIGNMENT BECAUSE ON EXAMINATION FROM 
18 MR. HOLLAND WE'VE GONE INTO — 
19 JUDGE BILLINGS: WAIT A MINUTE, WHAT'S THE 
20 ASSIGNMENT? 
21 MR. PANZER: THE ASSIGNMENT IS THE 1984 DOCUMENT. 
22 JUDGE BILLINGS: OKAY. 
23 MR. PANZER: MR. HOLLAND HAS GONE INTO ALLEGED 
24 REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY MARK LARSEN TO MR. TAYLOR. 
25 JUDGE BILLINGS: WELL, LET ME MAKE CLEAR WHAT 
127 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MY UNDERSTANDING IS OF WHERE WE ARE. I SUSTAINED ALL OBJEC-
TIONS TO ANY INTERPRETATION OF THAT DOCUMENT AS I FOUND THAT 
IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE, HOWEVER, 
IF THE CLAIM IS SOMEHOW THAT THEY WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED 
TO ENTER INTO THAT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THEN THAT'S 
ADMISSIBLE. I DON'T SEE WHERE THAT GETS ANYONE SINCE THAT'S 
NOT THE AGREEMENT WE'RE HERE ON. 
MR. PANZER: I GUESS I'D BETTER COVER THIS, YOUR 
HONOR. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: FEEL FREE. 
Q (BY MR. PANZER) MR. TAYLOR, WHERE DID YOU SIGN 
THIS AGREEMENT, THE ASSIGNMENT OF 1984? I BELIEVE THAT'S 
EXHIBIT 10. WHERE WERE YOU PHYSICALLY LOCATED WHEN YOU 
SIGNED IT? 
A I DO NOT KNOW. I WOULD JUST HAVE TO SAY IN PARK 
CITY. 
Q NOW, DIDN'T YOU JUST SAY A LITTLE WHILE AGO YOU 
WERE AT OUR OFFICES WHEN YOU SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT? 
A NO, I WAS NOT THERE WHEN WE SIGNED IT. I WAS 
THERE WHEN WE DISCUSSED IT. 
Q WHEN DID THAT HAPPEN? 
A I DON 'T KNOW THE DATE. 
Q WOULD IT HAVE BEEN BEFORE FEBRUARY OF 1984? 
A WHAT'S THE DATE ON THE DOCUMENT? 
Q IT APPEARS TO BE FEBRUARY 22, 1984. 
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1 OTHER PARTIES TO THIS ALSO. 
2 MR. NEMELKA: I JUST WANT TO MAKE FOR THE RECORD, 
3 THE OBJECTION TO MR. WESTMAN. 
4 MR. PANZER: YOUR HONOR, IT'S LEADING AS TO US. 
5 JUDGE BILLINGS: OVERRULED. 
6 J MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. WHERE ARE 
7 WE? WOULD YOU READ BACK THE LAST QUESTION? 
8 I JUDGE BILLINGS: WHY DON'T YOU REPHRASE IT. THE 
9 QUESTION, I THINK, HAD TO DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT MR. WESTMAN 
10 HEARD ANY REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE CHRISTIANSENS AS TO 
11 MR. GEIGER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP. 
12 MR. HOLLAND: I BELIEVE I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS 
13 AWARE THAT MR. GEIGER HAD ENTERED. INTO AN AGREEMENT TO 
14 PURCHASE. 
15 THE WITNESS: OKAY. 
16 MR. HOLLAND: MR. TAYLOR'S INTEREST. 
17 THE WITNESS: YES. 
18 Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) WERE YOU AWARE OF THAT? 
19 A YES. 
20 Q WERE YOU AWARE HE HAD GIVEN MR. TAYLOR A CHECK? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q WERE YOU AWARE MR. TAYLOR HAD CASHED THAT CHECK? 
23 A NO. 
24 Q DO YOU RECALL THE MEETING IN THE HOLIDAY INN IN 
25 OCTOBER OF 1980? 
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AND 
A 
Q 
A 
MYSELF 
Q 
YES. 
WHO WAS PRESENT AT THAT MEETING? 
I THINK DEE AND JAY AND GEIGER AND MR. TAYLOR 
o 1 
WERE ANY STATEMENTS MADE TO MR. GEIGER ABOUT 
ENTERING INTO THE AGREEMENT BY ANYONE AT THAT MEETING? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
TERMINATE 1 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I DON'T REMEMBER. 
IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THERE WERE? 
I SUPPOSE. 
ISN'T IT TRUE THAT — WELL, DID MR. GEIGER ASK TO 
HIS AGREEMENT AT THAT POINT? 
NO. 
WHEN DID MR. GEIGER DO SO, IF YOU KNOW? 
IT WAS SOME TIME AFTER THAT. 
HOW LONG AFTER THAT? 
I HAVE NO IDEA. 
WHEN DID YOU BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS TO PURCHASE THE 
INTEREST OF DEE AND JAY FROM THE B.W.C. PARTNERSHIP? 
OF 
A 
Q 
1981 SO 
A 
Q 
REJECTION? 
A 
I SUPPOSE ABOUT THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE. AGREEMENT. 
SO THE AGREEMENT, I BELIEVE, IS DATED IN MARCH 
THIS WOULD BE IN DECEMBER OF '80, JANUARY OF--
PROBABLY. 
SO THIS WOULD BE SHORTLY FOLLOWING MR. GEIGER'S 
I DON'T KNOW THE EXACT DATE OF THE MEETING WITH 
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1 GEIGER, BUT . . . 
2 MR. NEMELKA: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO--
3 MR. HOLLAND: WELL — 
4 Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) PRIOR TO MR. TAYLOR'S AND YOUR 
5 EXECUTION OF THE DOCUMENTS IN MARCH OF 1981 WERE THERE ANY, 
6 DID YOU MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS TO MR. TAYLOR AS TO THE 
7 |STATUS OF THE WATER AND SEWER AT THAT TIME? 
A I DON 'T THINK SO. 
Q DID YOU EVER TELL HIM HOW SOON THE APPROVAL WAS 
FORTHCOMING? 
A I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK WE ALL KNEW WHAT EVERY-
BODY KNEW ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT. 
Q AND WHAT WAS THAT? 
A WHATEVER THE SITUATION WAS AT THE TIME. OVER 
THAT PERIOD IT CHANGED. AT ONE TIME THEY DIDN'T HAVE ANY 
SEWER HOOKUPS, THEN WE HAD TO GO TO SEPTIC TANKS, AND BACK 
AND FORTH. BUT WE WERE NEVER IN A POSITION TO DO IT SO 
THAT'S WHY WE DIDN'T DO IT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. WERE YOU PRESENT FOR THE--STRIKE THAT. 
WERE YOU PRESENT WHEN MR. COMMICK WAS HIRED BY 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
B.W.C.? 
A NO. 
Q WERE YOU PRESENT FOR HIS INTERVIEW? 
A NO. 
Q WHY WAS MR. COMMICK HIRED, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE? 
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